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Firms are exposed to a variety of low-probability, high-impact risks that can disrupt their operations and
supply chains. These risks are difficult to predict and quantify; therefore, they are difficult to manage. As a
result, managers may suboptimally deploy countermeasures, leaving their firms exposed to some risks while
wasting resources to mitigate other risks that would not cause significant damage. In a three-year research
engagement with Ford Motor Company, we addressed this practical need by developing a novel risk-exposure
model that assesses the impact of a disruption originating anywhere in a firm’s supply chain. Our approach
defers the need for a company to estimate the probability associated with any specific disruption risk until
after it has learned the effect such a disruption will have on its operations. As a result, the company can
make more informed decisions about where to focus its limited risk-management resources. We demonstrate
how Ford applied this model to identify previously unrecognized risk exposures, evaluate predisruption risk-
mitigation actions, and develop optimal postdisruption contingency plans, including circumstances in which
the duration of the disruption is unknown.
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Many companies face considerable operational and supply chain risks that can materially
impact company performance. Given the complexity and scope of Ford Motor Company’s
operations, this is certainly its situation. Ford maintains over 50 plants worldwide, which
annually utilize 35 billion parts to produce six million cars and trucks. It has up to 10 tiers of
suppliers between itself and its raw materials. Its Tier 1 suppliers number 1,400 companies
across 4,400 manufacturing sites. A lengthy disruption anywhere in this extended supply
chain can have significant financial repercussions for Ford. A disruption to one of its second-
tier suppliers during the 2011 Thailand floods elevated the importance of this issue. As a
result of this disruption, Ford idled global production for one of its most profitable product
lines.
Ford is one of many companies exposed to such disruptions. For example, the 2011 flood-
ing in Thailand led Intel to cut its quarterly revenue target by $1 billion (Tibken 2011).
Driven in part by greater global trade and the adoption of lean operating principles, many
companies now operate with globally dispersed manufacturing facilities and extended sup-
ply chains. Normal accident theory holds that because major disruptions are an inherent
property of such complex and tightly coupled systems, they should be considered unavoid-
able or normal (Perrow 2011). It falls to operations and supply chain managers to navigate
this new normal. Traditional operational-disruption risk-assessment methods oblige firms
to identify the probability and magnitude of disruption risks early in the analysis process
(Sampson and Smith 1982, Knemeyer et al. 2009); however, managers face a number of
challenges in implementing such a solution. First, it is difficult and often impossible for
managers to accurately estimate the likelihood of low-probability, high-impact disruptive
events (Banks 2005, Taleb 2007). Second, managers tend to misallocate resources when
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facing low-probability events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Johnson et al. 1993), ignore
risks regardless of their potential significance (March and Shapira 1987), and distrust or
disregard precise probability estimates (Kunreuther 1976, March and Shapira 1987). This
can lead to inaction; Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003) found that most firms do little to proac-
tively prepare for such low-probability, high-impact disruptive events.
In this paper, we apply a new model, proposed by Simchi-Levi in March 2012 (Gilmore
2012) and described in Simchi-Levi et al. (2014), for analyzing operational-disruption risk
and detail the development and implementation of this model at Ford. Throughout the
paper, we share the primary results of our analysis using masked versions of Ford’s oper-
ational and supply chain data.
Literature Review
We leverage two streams of research in our work. The first area of scholarship pertains
to supply chain network modeling and optimization, which broadly consider the optimal
network structure under steady state operations (Fisher et al. 1997, Graves and Willems
2003) or under the possibility of a disruption (Snyder et al. 2006, Peng et al. 2011, Mak
and Shen 2012). Closely related is research that evaluates coordination strategies between
buyers and suppliers in the presence of disruption risk (Tomlin 2006, Chopra et al. 2007,
Tomlin 2009). Less attention has been given to evaluating the impact of a disruption based
on the optimal response of an existing network once that disruption has occurred. A recent
exception is Schmitt (2011), which evaluates response strategies that minimize the service-
level impact when disruption occurs on a multiechelon network for a random duration.
Another is MacKenzie et al. (2014), which evaluates the interaction between the supplier
and buyer response strategies under a random-duration disruption.
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We make three important contributions to this literature. First, we develop our model
for practical applications using large-scale supply chain data from Ford. Second, we eval-
uate the optimal contingency plans for settings in which the disruption duration is either
known exactly or described by an uncertainty set. Finally, our model quantifies the disrup-
tion exposure across all the nodes in the company’s supply chain based on company-level
performance impacts.
The second stream of research seek to classify operational disruptions and quantify their
impact. Scholars and practitioners generally agree that operational disruptions materi-
ally and negatively impact company performance on average (Sheffi 2005, Hendricks and
Singhal 2005, World Economic Forum 2013). There is less agreement, however, on how
we should classify and forecast such disruptions (Kleindorfer and Saad 2005, Tang 2006,
Wagner and Bode 2006, Sodhi et al. 2012). Researchers are only beginning to understand
which disruptions have the greatest impact on firm performance. Answering this research
question is important because it informs firms on which disruptions warrant mitigation
investments. Craighead et al. (2007) propose that supply chain density, complexity, and
node criticality contribute to the severity of disruptions. Tang (2006) theorizes that a firm’s
vulnerability to disruption depends on its supply chain strategies, including postponement
strategies and inventory placement. Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) identify that a firm’s
organizational integration practices are associated with the firm’s ability to mitigate the
consequences of disruptions. Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) provide evidence that changes
to risk-assessment and risk-mitigation practices reduce the impact of disruptions in the
chemical industry.
We contribute to this body of research by identifying the specific nodes in a firm’s
operations and supply chain that would, if disrupted, result in the greatest damage to firm
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performance. We believe that this result is particularly beneficial in an applied setting
because it allows firms to understand their exposures at specific operational locations and
put in place countermeasures that address the greatest sources of exposure.
Our research generally aligns with concepts applied in other disciplines, including esti-
mating maximum foreseeable loss (i.e., the maximum loss if all safeguards in a system
break) in the insurance industry and conducting failure analysis (i.e., assessing the struc-
tural resilience when a critical member of a system is removed) in structural design. Until
now, however, the field of operational risk management has not given these principles much
attention.
Limitations of the Legacy Risk-Analysis Approach
For many companies, even those that have world-class operations and supply chain man-
agement systems, proactively managing high-impact, low-probability disruption risks is
challenging. One obstacle to conducting a more insightful analysis of disruption risks is that
operational disruptions are both difficult to predict and have a highly uncertain impact
on performance. In Ford’s case, the scale and dynamic nature of its supply chain further
complicate this problem. These factors increase both the number of disruption scenarios to
consider and the frequency at which we should evaluate those scenarios. A second obsta-
cle is data availability, particularly on suppliers at lower tiers within the supply chain.
Supply chain transparency is a challenge for the entire automotive industry. Suppliers
to the industry have historically been reluctant to provide the automobile manufacturers
with detailed information about their suppliers and their suppliers’ suppliers. As a result,
although manufacturers typically have good information on Tier 1 suppliers (i.e., compa-
nies that supply directly to the manufacturer), they have considerably less information on
lower-tier suppliers in the supply chain.
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Given these limitations, legacy risk-management processes often focus on tracking the
status of only a handful of suppliers and part numbers. These tend to be suppliers that
provide major assembly components and represent a large portion of the total component
costs. Many large manufacturers recognize that material exposures are likely to be hidden
among the suppliers who are not included in this regular review process. Because of the
difficulties in predicting disruptions, the data limitations, and the size of their supply
chains, companies often cannot identify where these exposures are, much less quantify their
impact. For example, managers at Ford estimate that conducting a traditional risk analysis
for all of Ford’s more-than 4,000 Tier 1 supplier sites would likely take two or three years,
at which time the analysis would be obsolete.
Our Approach: Risk-Exposure Index
Recognizing that managers have limited ability to predict low-probability, high-impact
risks or collect detailed data on lower levels of their supply chain, our approach, initially
described in Simchi-Levi et al. (2014), advocates integrating a vulnerability-based analy-
sis into supply chain risk assessments. In such an analysis, the focus is on understanding
the impact of a disruption, regardless of its source. This defers the need to estimate the
probability associated with any specific risk and collect detailed information from subtier
suppliers until after Ford has determined the impact a disruption will have on its oper-
ations. At that point, Ford can make a more informed decision about where to focus its
limited risk-assessment resources. Our approach suits the goal of analyzing supply chain
disruptions because the impact of a disruption often does not depend on the cause of the
disruption but rather on its duration. In addition, the potential mitigation actions that
a company can practically employ in response to a supply chain disruption are often the
same regardless of the specific causes of the disruption. Finally, our approach implicitly
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recognizes that supply chains are in a continuous state of flux. In the face of such constant
change, maintaining up-to-date predictions of the likelihood of specific risks is nontriv-
ial; however, given that a disruption does occur, estimating a firm’s vulnerability is more
tractable.
Time-To-Recover Model
The model considers the supply chain as a graph representing the movements of supplier
parts from each supplier facility to each of a firm’s facilities and product lines. A node,
also referred to as a stage, in the graph is equivalent to a part or manufacturing process
at a particular supplier or Ford facility. Inputs to the model include operational and (or)
financial measures (e.g., unit profitability) and in-transit and on-site inventory levels for
each node. Our model incorporates the time-to-recover (TTR) of each node in the supply
chain network, which represents the time it takes for a node to recover to full functionality
after a disruption (Miklovic and Witty 2010, Simchi-Levi et al. 2014). This value can be
unique at each node in the firm’s supply chain.
The model iterates over each node in the graph, disrupting the node for the duration
of its TTR and calculating the corresponding impact on the firm’s performance. It deter-
mines the performance impact assuming the firm responds optimally to the disruption
scenarios, where the model simulates the optimal responses by solving an associated linear
optimization problem; see Appendix A for details. The model can accommodate differ-
ent performance measures as the objective for this optimization, including minimizing the
lost units of production, lost sales, or lost profit margin. For each disruption scenario, the
model searches on how to reallocate existing inventory, redirect supply alternatives, and
idle downstream plants such that the disruption has the smallest impact. The resulting
performance impact (PI) is the impact of that disruption scenario on the firm’s chosen
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performance measure during the TTR. To simplify cross-scenario comparisons, the model
can also calculate a risk-exposure index (REI) (Simchi-Levi et al. 2014), which normalizes
the PI for each scenario by the maximum PI over all scenarios considered in the analysis.
The model can accommodate simultaneous disruptions in multiple supply chain nodes.
This allows management to analyze complex disruption scenarios, including disruptions
that affect all the parts from one supplier plant or disruptions that affect all the same
part regardless of the supplier. We can extend the model to account for alternative sources
of supply and supplier capacity commitments. This facilitates an explicit examination of
interactive effects, which may occur when multiple firms try to adjust to supply disruptions
at the same time. For example, if a supplier fails to deliver to one firm, it may have gone
down for multiple firms. Such an event makes other potentially compensating nodes (e.g.,
backup suppliers) more congested.
Time-To-Survive Model
In many cases, accurate TTR information may not be available. More importantly, a
supplier may be optimistic when assessing its TTR; that is, a supplier may underestimate
the time required to recover and hence may underestimate Ford’s exposure to a disruption.
Therefore, Ford is interested in identifying suppliers whose disruption impact is sensitive
to the given TTR information. For this purpose, we introduce the time-to-survive (TTS)
concept, which we define as the maximum amount of time the system can function without
performance loss if a particular node is disrupted (Simchi-Levi et al. 2013). As we will show,
we determine the TTS associated with a specific node by solving an optimization problem
that takes into account the entire supply chain after, for example, node removal, inventory
levels, and alternative sources of supply; see Appendix B for the model formulation. The
firm can determine whether a more accurate measure of TTR is necessary by comparing
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the TTS value associated with a specific node with the TTR estimate of that node. If the
TTS far exceeds the TTR, it implies that a large change in TTR will have little impact
on the firm’s risk exposure; however, nodes with short TTS values require Ford to engage
these suppliers in a detailed discussion about their TTRs.
Implementation at Ford
We implemented our model as a decision support system during a three-year research
engagement between MIT and Ford. The first phase of the project included the assess-
ment of existing risk-management approaches. In the second phase, we worked with the
Ford optimization and IT teams to focus on model design and implementation, and the
integration of the optimization model and Ford’s IT system. The modeler and optimiza-
tion specialists communicated weekly, and received help from Ford’s procurement team to
validate the model’s output.
Ford’s procurement staff used the decision support system in three ways: (1) strategically,
to identify exposure to risk associated with parts and suppliers, effectively prioritize and
allocate resources, segment suppliers, and develop mitigation strategies; (2) tactically, to
track daily changes in risk exposure to alert procurement executives to changes in their
risk position; and (3) operationally, to identify effective ways to allocate resources after
a disruption. Using the model to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its risk exposures
(i.e., the strategic level), Ford identified several supply chain nodes that would have a large
impact on its operations if disrupted. These large exposures lie in unlikely places, such as
nonstrategic suppliers or parts that the company spends relatively little money to procure.
Armed with this information, Ford can make more informed decisions on how to deploy
its risk-assessment resources and mitigate the effects of a disruption to these nodes.
In this section, we describe the insights our model provides at the strategic, tactical, and
operational levels for Ford’s risk-analysis, procurement, and management teams.
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Evaluation of Node Criticality with the TTS Model
As we discussed in the previous section, TTR information is not known accurately in many
practical situations because of information uncertainty and optimistic supplier assessments.
Therefore, the first step of our risk-analysis process is to identify the disruption scenarios
that would lead to immediate performance deterioration, namely, to find nodes with small
TTS values. Nodes that represent higher exposure levels will have a TTS value that is
lower than a threshold value, for example TTR plus a safety allowance.
Figure 1 shows that the suppliers included in the analysis have a range of TTS values.
Many suppliers have TTS values of less than a week. Ford’s management can use this
information to concentrate on the PI of low-TTS suppliers and acquire corresponding TTR
information. In addition, by identifying the nodes with high TTS values, this analysis can
identify potential waste, caused by excessive protection (strategic inventory), within the
system. For such nodes, a firm may reduce (strategic) inventory, thus providing significant
cost savings.
Application to Strategic Decisions
Strategically, Ford utilizes the TTR model to identify risk exposure of parts and suppliers,
allowing it to prioritize resource allocation. Furthermore, by combining the risk exposure
of suppliers with other information, such as the total spend at various supplier sites, Ford
gains insights about possible mitigation strategies it could adopt toward various types of
suppliers. Below, we describe these applications of the model to Ford.
Figure 2 is based on the PI output (in this case, lost sales measured by the impact of
vehicle-production volume) from a model run, including all the critical suppliers and Ford
plants that support Ford’s North American assembly plants. As the figure indicates, a
significant portion of the suppliers do not expose Ford to any risk; however, more than 400
sites have very high PIs.
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Figure 1 A significant portion of the suppliers have very low TTS values, thus requiring more accurate TTR
evaluation and closer monitoring for risk-exposure assessment. In addition, some suppliers have very
high TTS values, possibly because of redundant inventory buffers.
Number of Sites
Performance Impact (Lost Sales in Vehicle Volume)
2773
805
142
252
154
408
1
201
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Figure 2 Among 4,534 sites examined, 2,773 sites have zero impact at the time of analysis and 408 have very
high impact.
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Figure 3 Impact of a disruption at a supplier site (node) on Ford’s lost profits is not correlated with the amount
Ford spends at the supplier. Each circle represents a unique supplier site.
In Figure 3, we take a closer look at these very high PI suppliers and see that some of the
largest exposures reside in unlikely places, such as the production and (or) procurement of
low-cost, commoditized parts. Therefore, some of the traditional risk-mitigation strategies
(e.g., focusing on high-spend suppliers) may lead to wasteful resource allocation at low-
exposure sites and insufficient protection at high-exposure sites.
Figure 3 suggests that Ford should reduce its exposure to risk by segmenting suppliers
into three categories depending on the supplier’s PI and total spend. Each segment presents
a different set of challenges; therefore, Ford should use different mitigation strategies,
as Figure 4 illustrates. First, suppliers on the left side of the chart have low exposure;
therefore, Ford’s primary actions in many of these cases should involve signing long-term
supply contracts and tracking inventory.
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Supplier sites with high total spend and high PI are at the top right side of the chart.
This segment includes, for example, suppliers of seats and instrument panels. These items
strongly affect the customer experience, and their prices represent a large portion of the
total manufacturing cost. We typically refer to them as strategic components and their
corresponding suppliers as strategic suppliers. For many companies, this segment repre-
sents 20 percent of their suppliers, which accounts for about 80 percent of total spend.
Typically, each of these components has a single strategic supplier. An appropriate supply
strategy for these items is to focus on long-term partnerships with suppliers and implement
effective supply contracts where Ford can share risks with suppliers and track performance.
Importantly, because of the high total spend with these suppliers, Ford may be able to
compel some of these suppliers to have backup supply sites in different regions.
The most challenging suppliers are those whose total spend is low and PI is high (i.e.,
suppliers at the bottom right side of the chart). To ensure supply, a firm may invest in
inventory, require the supplier to have dual sites in different regions, or apply a dual-
sourcing strategy. Unfortunately, each of these mitigation strategies may cause a problem.
Investing in inventory may not be consistent with the lean strategy the company is apply-
ing. Low total spend implies that the firm is not in a good position to require the supplier
to have multiple sites. In addition, some of these suppliers are associated with high-volume,
low-cost, and low-margin components. For these components, competition typically shifts
to a few manufacturers that dominate the market because of their lower costs and superior
quality; as a result, engaging in a dual-sourcing strategy is difficult. In our experience, one
possible mitigation strategy involves a new product design in which components are stan-
dardized, allowing the firm to shift more volume and more spend to the supplier; hence,
the firm would be in a good position to require dual sites.
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Figure 4 This graph suggests supplier segmentation and different risk-mitigation strategies for different groups
of suppliers.
Application to Tactical Decisions
Recall that for some components, risk exposure is directly proportional to the level of inven-
tory of that component in Ford’s supply chain. To identify risk exposure, pipeline inven-
tory information is uploaded to the system on a regular basis, and the system determines
the performance impact by component anywhere in the supply chain. When performance
impact is above a specific level, procurement specialists initiate a process to understand
the reason and take corrective action. In that respect, our system serves as a control tower
that allows the firm to monitor suppliers’ performance and inventory trends to take action
before problems occur. Because the company takes actions in anticipation of a potential
adverse event, it can minimize the financial impact if such events happen.
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Application to Operational Decisions
Operationally, Ford supply-risk specialists use the model to respond to a disruption event.
For example, a few months ago, political problems in one region motivated the procurement
department to identify the high-exposure suppliers in that region and find alternative
sources of supply for these components.
In such situations, our TTR model optimizes inventory and capacity allocation deci-
sions when a disruption occurs (Appendix A), assuming that accurate TTR information
is available immediately after a disruption occurs. Unfortunately, TTR may be different
for different modes of disruptions (e.g., process disruption versus tooling damage), and the
firm may not know the exact TTR value when a disruption occurs. Therefore, identifying
robust allocations of inventory and capacities under such uncertainty in TTR values is
important.
Figure 5 provides a stylized example that compares the impact of different resource-
allocation strategies when the length of the disruption varies. In this figure, each curve
represents the financial impact of one resource-allocation strategy. For example, the solid
curve corresponds to the optimal resource-allocation strategy for TTR=1; we evaluate
the performance of this resource allocation strategy for all TTR values between 0 and 2.
Similarly, the dotted curve is associated with the optimal resource-allocation strategy when
TTR=0.7. Figure 5 suggests that neither of the two strategies dominates; that is, neither
strategy outperforms the other on all TTR values between 0.7 and 1. This is not always
the case. Another stylized example (Figure 6) shows that the strategy associated with the
solid line outperforms the strategy associated with the dotted line. The former strategy
outperforms all other strategies for TTR values between 0 and 2 (Figure 6 does not show
other strategies); that is, the solid line either matches or dominates the performance of
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Figure 5 Each curve represents the financial impact of one resource-allocation decision. The solid curve is optimal
for TTR=1, but suboptimal for TTR=0.7; the reverse is true for the dotted line.
any other resource-allocation strategy determined by using a single TTR value between 0
and 2.
Motivated by these different cases, we developed an algorithm that can (1) find a domi-
nating strategy if it exists, or (2) find a Pareto-optimal strategy, which always exists. That
is, managers can specify the ranking of potential TTR values, and the algorithm provides
a strategy that is not dominated by any other strategy. We describe the algorithm in
Appendix A. We also refer the reader to Zhang (2014) for a more in-depth discussion.
System Architecture
To allow procurement and risk specialists to take advantage of our model, Ford developed a
decision support system that integrates various databases, the TTR and TTS models, and a
data-visualization software package. The data sources include Ford’s material requirements
planning (MRP) system, its purchasing database, and sales-volume planning information.
Figure 7 describes the system architecture in which various data sets, including bill of
material, part routing, inventory levels, and plant vehicle volumes are used to map Ford’s
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Figure 6 Each curve represents the financial impact of one resource-allocation decision. The solid curve is optimal
for all nonnegative TTR values.
supply chain. Gusikhin and Klampfl (2012) describe the basic methodology of mapping
the Ford supply chain. Our optimization engine uses the results to generate the various
performance impacts. These performance measures are then presented to the users by
Tableau data visualization, which includes a geographic mapping capability. Thus, users
can view results both in tabular form and in various graphical formats. Figure 8 provides
a screenshot of our interface; the size of the circles identifies the performance impact of
a disruption to the supplier in that geographic location. The two tables at the bottom of
Figure 8 provide detailed information on suppliers and parts. For each supplier, the table
on the left provides the vehicle affected, total spend at that supplier, financial impact, and
production-volume impact if that supplier is disrupted for the duration of its TTR. The
table on the right provides all affected parts associated with each supplier.
Procurement and risk specialists regularly use the system to track risk exposures in real
time as inventory levels fluctuate and the supply chain structure evolves. The frequency
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Figure 7 Ford’s risk-analysis framework integrates databases, our risk-exposure model, and an output visualiza-
tion tool.
of updates relies on the efficient data integration technology developed by Ford and the
computational tractability of our linear programming models (Appendices A and B).
Realized Benefits for Ford
Ford spends several million dollars per year to proactively manage its operational and
supply chain risk. Two points make clear why Ford must deploy its risk-management
resources in the most effective manner possible. First, it must spread these resources across
a huge operational footprint. Ford’s operations and supply chain include over 4,400 Tier
1 supplier sites, hundreds of thousands of lower-tier suppliers (Tier 2 and lower), over 50
Ford-owned facilities, 130,000 unique parts, 35 billion total parts annually, and over $80
billion annually in external procurement. Second, the cost of failure can be huge because
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Supplier Vehicle Impacted Total Part Cost Financial Impact Volume Impact Supplier Part Names
x11 cc1 $$$ $$$ vvv x11 y11
x12 cc2 $$$ $$$ vvv x11 y12
x13 cc3 $$$ $$$ vvv x11 y13
x14 cc4 $$$ $$$ vvv x12 y21
x15 cc5 $$$ $$$ vvv x12 y22
x16 cc6 $$$ $$$ vvv x13 y31
x17 cc7 $$$ $$$ vvv x13 y32
x18 cc8 $$$ $$$ vvv x13 y33
x19 cc9 $$$ $$$ vvv x13 y34
x20 cc10 $$$ $$$ vvv x14 y41
Figure 8 Critical suppliers are mapped to geographical location. The size of a circle indicates the magnitude of
the impact on Ford’s performance if a supplier is disrupted. The table view gives detailed information
regarding the financial and vehicle-volume impact associated with these suppliers.
supply chain disruptions can have a significant impact on Ford’s ability to match supply
with demand. Indeed, Ford estimates that the lost revenue associated with a disruption
can be significant. To illustrate this point, recall that in 2011 Toyota lost 800,000 units
of production volume as a result of the Japan earthquake and more than 240,000 units
of production volume as a result of the flood in Thailand. Honda faced similar challenges
(Schmidt and Simchi-Levi 2013).
The risk-exposure model produces important and tangible benefits for Ford to help it
effectively identify and manage its risks. First, Ford has identified supplier sites that have a
material impact if disrupted, but that it did not recognize as high-exposure sites. Based on
the model results, 2,600 Tier 1 supplier sites have nonzero vehicle-volume impact that, if
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disrupted, would adversely impact its revenue by up to $2.5 billion. Ford now classifies these
exposures as as high-priority issues that require a formal remediation analysis. Identifying
these suppliers is particularly compelling because they represent 1,500 additional supplier
sites that will now receive a larger share of Ford’s risk-management resources. Identifying
and addressing such risk exposures directly supports Ford’s corporate strategy.
A second benefit is identifying low-exposure supplier sites that are currently receiving
an excessive allocation of Ford’s risk-management resources. The model has identified
over 400 supplier sites that Ford includes in its risk-monitoring program, but which pose
insignificant exposure to the company if disrupted. This information has allowed Ford to
more efficiently allocate its supplier risk-management resources.
By reallocating these resources, Ford is better able to protect itself from the highest-
impact exposures in its operations and supply chain. For example, the lost revenue associ-
ated with a two-week disruption to the newly classified high-impact supplier sites ranges
from several hundred thousand dollars to $2.5 billion; in contrast, the lost-revenue impact
associated with a two-week disruption to each of the formerly classified high-impact sup-
plier sites is minimal. In the words of Ford manager Michael Sanders, “This has been
one of the key game changers for us. This enables us to focus on the supplier sites which
would have a high or very high impact on performance if disrupted, and lets us put all our
resources and all our knowledge into making sure we have robust plans to protect us in
the event that something happens with any one of those sites” (Simchi-Levi and Sanders
2013).
Finally, our model detects hidden risks in Ford’s supply chain. For example, it identified
a low-cost sensor that has high vehicle exposure; however, because of the low total spend,
Ford’s procurement group was not paying much attention to this component. Following the
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risk analysis, the commodity team acknowledged the sourcing concentration and associated
risk and developed a mitigation strategy.
Discussion
Firms operate in a constantly changing environment in which operational risks are increas-
ing. In the automotive industry, four factors contribute to increasing levels of operational
vulnerability. The first factor is the proliferation of global programs and the related need
to maximize the operational scale of these programs. This results in less redundancy and
more dependence on fewer suppliers, increasing the supply chain’s exposure if one of these
suppliers is disrupted. The second is the ongoing consolidation in the supply base and
the fiscal incentives to maximize the use of supplier resources. This also results in greater
supplier concentration and less slack capacity for the most critical subtier manufactur-
ing components, including electrical components, raw materials, and chemical precursors.
Third, manufacturers’ efforts to push their Tier 1 suppliers toward lower costs ultimately
drive those suppliers to pursue subtier sourcing in emerging markets. This further extends
the manufacturers’ supply chains, adding more dependencies and potential points of failure.
Finally, unlike the situation in the PC industry, in the automotive industry, no common
standards are applied across OEMs for electronic components; hence, very few suppliers
are available for these components. Any supplier disruption can shut down Ford’s ability
to match supply with demand.
The automotive industry is not alone in facing increased disruption risk. Trends toward
more extended supply chains and reduced operational buffers are gripping many indus-
tries. As a result, supply chain executives have a dual mission—to systematically address
extreme risks such as hurricanes, epidemics, earthquakes, or port closings, and to manage
operational risks, such as forecast errors, sourcing problems, and transportation break-
downs. Succeeding in this dual mission is difficult because company operations and supply
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chains are increasingly dynamic, and the occurrence and impact of disruptions are difficult
to predict.
In this paper, we provide a new approach for supply chain risk management, which
reduces the need to estimate the likelihood of low-probability, high-impact events. Our
method focuses on evaluating a firm’s vulnerability, given that a disruption could occur
anywhere across its supply chain. This approach helps Ford streamline and better target its
operational-disruption risk-assessment process, deepen its understanding of its disruption
risks across both its internal operations and extended supply chain, and rapidly and con-
sistently assess its supply chain risk-mitigation initiatives. Ford also takes advantage of the
model’s capability of running at various levels of detail. For example, in some applications,
the company runs the model by aggregating nodes within a geographic region, and then
drills down into more detail by running it using more granular representations for nodes.
Our risk-exposure model augments rather than replaces traditional risk-analysis meth-
ods. Ford incorporates the results of the model with other indicators that measure each
supplier’s financial risk, including metrics for financial health, and steady state operational
risk, including metrics for service level performance and quality control compliance. Sup-
pliers that trigger one or more risk areas (i.e., disruption, financial, or operational) are
identified for follow-up with Ford’s supplier risk-management team. By including the model
in its broader supplier risk-analysis process, Ford can more confidently and accurately iden-
tify the areas in its supply chain and operations to allocate its limited risk-management
and mitigation resources.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge the contributions of many people in Ford Purchasing and Information Technology (IT)
for their support of this project. We especially acknowledge Steve Faraci from Ford Purchasing for his
Simchi-Levi et al.: Managing Risks and Disruptions in Automotive Supply Chain
Article submitted to Interfaces; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) 23
invaluable contributions. We thank John Knowles and Dong Ruan from Ford IT for their consultations
and programming in data collections. We also gratefully acknowledge John Ginder from Ford Research and
Advanced Engineering for his leadership and strong support of the project. This work was funded by the
Ford-MIT Alliance.
Appendix A: Time-to-Recover Model
We first present a single-tier supply chain model (ST) to illustrate some of the main concepts, and then extend
it to a multiple-tier model (MT) that encompasses more components. The basic premise of both models is
that given a supply chain structure (a graph) and a disruption scenario (interrupted nodes and edges), we
determine how to allocate the firm’s remaining resources to optimize its ability to satisfy exogenous demand.
A node (or stage) in the graph is a component or manufacturing process at a particular supplier or assembly
site; an edge is a directed flow of materials from an upstream stage to a downstream stage. We formulate
both models as linear optimization programs. We summarize our notation for the single-tier model in Table
1 and for the multiple-tier model in Table 2.
In the ST model, the firm has a set of plants (A), which produce a set of products (V). The firm’s objective
for each disruption scenario is to minimize the impact of the disruption on its chosen performance metric.
We capture this through the following linear program.
minimize
∑
j∈V fjl
(n)
j
s.t.
∑
i:(i,j)∈F(n) y
(n)
ij + l
(n)
j ≥ djt(n)− sj , ∀j ∈ V∑
j:(i,j)∈F(n) y
(n)
ij ≤ cit(n), ∀i∈A\n
y
(n)
ij , l
(n)
j ≥ 0, ∀i∈A, j ∈ V
In this model, decision variable y
(n)
ij is the cumulative production of j at plant i in disruption scenario n.
Variable l
(n)
j is the amount of lost demand for product j in disruption scenario n. Parameter f
(n)
j refers to
the impact of one unit of loss in sales for product j, for example, the profit margin; t(n) is the TTR for this
disruption scenario. dj and sj are the demand and inventory for product j, respectively. Flexibility design
F (n) is the set of edges that are still alive during disruption scenario n.
The objective function is the minimization of the total weighted loss as a result of the disruption. The
first constraint is a lower-bound constraint for the number of units lost for product j, given the production
and inventory conditions. The second constraint is a total capacity constraint on the assembly plant i. We
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Symbol Explanation
Superscript (n) Disruption scenario n.
A Set of all suppliers sites (plants).
V Set of all final nodes (vehicles).
F (n) Set of production edges under disruption scenario n.
t(n) TTR for disruption scenario n.
ci Total production capacity of node i per unit time.
si Finished goods inventory of node i.
fj Profit margin of product j.
dj Demand for j (per time unit).
lj Lost production volume of vehicle type j.
yij Amount of product j produced at plant i.
Table 1 This table lists the parameters and variables of the single-tier model and their explanations.
can replace the linear objective function with a convex one in a more general case, for example, accounting
for lost market share if the loss exceeds a specific threshold.
Solving one instance of this linear program measures the impact of one disruption scenario. A crucial step
of using this model is the construction of the set of disruption scenarios of interest. The identification of
this set is a self-contained step that can be performed by the business executives and risk managers. For
example, when the firm aims to identify the most crucial node of the system, the disruption scenarios are
constructed as all events that relate to the removal of a single node from the graph. This is the paradigm
adopted for the analysis at Ford.
Although the ST model explicitly captures only the last tier of the production system, it can be used to
analyze a disruption at a supplier in an upstream tier. To do so, we disrupt the nodes in the final tier that
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depend on the upstream supplier and solve ST. This is reasonable if the firm has little control over the nodes
prior to the last tier and if the firm knows which final tier nodes will be affected by the disruption. These
assumptions may be too conservative, for example, in situations in which the firm has control over upstream
resource allocation and routing. We present a multiple-tier model that address this more general case.
The MT model is similar to the single-tier model. We include the concept of parts, which refers to the
set of nodes that are functionally equivalent in the manufacturing process, but potentially processed at a
different plant or supplier site.
minimize
∑
j∈V fjlj
s.t. uj −
∑
i∈Pjk yij/rkj ≤ 0, ∀k ∈N−(j),∀j ∈D∑
j∈N+(i) yij −ui ≤ si, ∀i∈ U
uj = 0, ∀j ∈ S(n)
lj +
∑
k∈Vj uk ≥ djt(n), ∀j ∈ V∑
k∈Aα uk ≤ cαt(n), ∀α∈A
lj , uj , yij ≥ 0.
The first constraint is a bill-of-materials constraint; for every node j, we limit the production of node j
(denoted by uj) by the most-scarce parent part. More specifically, for this node j (e.g., an engine), there
are multiple parent nodes (e.g., components of an engine). Variable yij represents the material flow from
node i to node j. If two parent nodes, i and i′, represent the same physical and (or) functional part (e.g.,
the same type of bolts from two different suppliers), we say that i and i′ are of the same part type. We
invoke an additional index k to denote the part type of a node, and use rkj to represent the amount of type
k parts required to produce one unit of node j. The ratio yij/rkj is then the units of node j that can be
produced with yij units of type k parts from node i. We use Pjk to represent the set of all nodes that are
(1) upstream of j, and (2) of part type k. Hence,
∑
i∈Pjk yij/rkj represents the maximum amount of j that
can be produced given the aggregated supply of type k materials from upstream nodes in Pjk.
The second constraint is also a bill-of-materials constraint, which limits the total outflow of node i
(
∑
j∈N+(i) yij) to be less than the sum of production (ui) and inventory (si) at the current location.
The third constraint is the disruption constraint, which limits the production of disrupted node j (i.e., uj)
to be zero. The fourth and fifth constraints are similar to the first and second constraints in the ST model.
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Symbol Explanation
D Set of all but the first tier nodes.
U Set of all but the final nodes (vehicles).
S(n) Set of all disrupted nodes for disruption scenario n.
A Set of all suppliers sites (plants).
Aα Set of all nodes produced at supplier and (or) plant α.
V Set of all final nodes (vehicles).
Vj Set of all final nodes (vehicles) that are of the same type (j).
N−(i) Set of parts required to produce node i.
N+(i) Set of nodes that require node i.
Pjk Set of all nodes that are in the upstream of node j and of part type k.
t(n) TTR for disruption scenario n.
ui Total production quantity of nodes i during time t
(n).
lj Lost production volume of vehicle type j.
yij Allocation of upstream node i to downstream node j during time t
(n).
si Finished goods inventory of node i.
rkj Number of type k parts required to make one unit of node j.
fj Performance impact (e.g., profit margin) of one unit of product j.
dj Demand for j per time unit.
ci Production capacity of node i per unit time.
Table 2 This table lists the parameters and variables of the multiple-tier model and their explanations.
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In both the ST and MT models, we make the simplifying assumption that processing lead times are not
significant relative to the impact of the disruption. In the MT model, we also assume that the costs of
rerouting materials and manufacturing changeovers are not significant relative to the impact of the disruption.
These are often reasonable assumptions in the context of high-impact disruptions, the effect of which dwarfs
the impact of these other issues.
The ST and MT linear programs generate prescriptive contingency plans that minimize the impact of the
disruption on the firm’s chosen performance metric. Under each disruption scenario, the optimization model
generates a corresponding set of optimal values for the decision variables, denoting the best routing and
resource-allocation plans for that disruption.
Procedure for Finding Pareto Efficient Solutions Under TTR Uncertainty
Given a finite set of n TTR values and an ordering of their importance (given by a manager, for example),
we can find a resource-allocation strategy that is Pareto efficient (i.e., not dominated by any other strategy)
on this set of TTR values. This is in spirit the same as finding a lexicographically optimal solution in
multiobjective optimization (Ehrgott 2005), where the n objectives correspond to the performance impact
under these n TTR values. Using x to represent the resource-allocation strategy, and f(x, t) and {x |Ax≥
b(t)} as the objective function and feasible region of the TTR model, respectively, we provide the procedure
for finding a Pareto-efficient solution as follows:
Algorithm 1 Pareto Efficient Resource-Allocation Strategy Algorithm
1: Solve the original TTR linear optimization model with t = t1, and obtain resource-allocation strategy
x1, which minimizes f(x, t1) over the set {x|Ax≥ b,x≥ 0}.
2: Determine the strategy x2, which minimizes f(x, t2) over the set {x|f(x, t1) = f(x1, t1),Ax≥ b,x≥ 0}.
3: For 3 ≤ k ≤ n, determine the strategy xk, which minimizes f(x, tk) over the set {x|f(x, ti) =
f(xi, ti) for each 1≤ i≤ k− 1,Ax≥ b,x≥ 0}.
Appendix B: Time-To-Survive Model
We define time-to-survive to be the longest time that the firm can last without losing demand after a
disruption happens. Time-to-survive for the disruption scenario n can be calculated by solving the following
linear program. This model is a special case of the TTR model in the sense that we can find the TTS of
the network by solving a number of TTR models with different TTR values, and look for the smallest TTR
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value corresponding to the financial impact being strictly positive. This TTS formulation is more efficient
because we can find the TTS by solving a single linear program.
maximize t(n)
s.t. uj −
∑
i∈Pjk yij/rkj ≤ 0, ∀k ∈N−(j),∀j ∈D∑
j∈N+(i) yij −ui ≤ si, ∀i∈ U
uj = 0, ∀j ∈ S(n)∑
k∈Vj uk ≥ djt(n), ∀j ∈ V∑
k∈Aα uk ≤ cαt(n), ∀α∈A
uj , yij , t
(n) ≥ 0,
where the constraints and variables are similar to the TTR models, except that (1) t(n) is now a decision
variable (TTS), and (2) we do not allow any loss (demand is strictly satisfied in the fourth constraint). The
objective value of each optimization instance reveals the TTS of the underlying disruption scenario.
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